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1. Introduction
Chaotic maps possess an ergodic behavior which makes them suitable for the de-
sign of new cryptosystems. This is the case of the cryptosystem proposed in Ref. 1.
This cryptosystem is based on the tent map and has been cryptanalyzed in Ref. 2
and later improved in Ref. 3. In Ref. 4 a new modification on the original scheme
described in Ref. 1 was proposed. The authors of this new proposal claim that this
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modification overcomes all the security problems that were emphasized in Ref. 2, 3.
Nevertheless, in this paper we show that the ciphertext still includes enough infor-
mation to enable a chosen-ciphertext attack based on symbolic dynamics. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows. First of all, Sec. 2 gives a brief introduction to
the cryptosystem under study. After that, in Sec. 3 the symbolic dynamics based
chosen-ciphertext attack is explained. Then some other problems of the cryptosys-
tem under study are discussed in Sec. 4, and finally the last section gives some final
comments and conclusions.
2. Description of the cryptosystem
The cryptosystem described in Ref. 4 is based on the transformation of chaotic orbits
into binary sequences. These chaotic orbits are generated using a one-dimensional
chaotic map defined by
xn+1 = f(xn, r), (1)
where f : I → I and 0.5 ∈ I ⊂ R. If Eq. (1) is iterated N times, then a chaotic
orbit will be obtained as
{xn}Nn=0 = {x0, x1, . . . , xN} . (2)
The authors of Ref. 4 do not explicitly indicate if x0 is also included in the chaotic
orbit as the first chaotic state. Without loss of generality, in this paper we will
assume that this was included.
Finally, the binary counterpart (i.e., the symbolic dynamics based representa-
tion) of the original chaotic orbit is given by
gn = gn(x0, r) =
{
0 , if xn < 0.5,
1 , if xn ≥ 0.5, (3)
for 0 ≤ n ≤ N . Henceforth, the binary sequence {gn(x0, r)}Nn=0 is noted asGN (x0, r)
to emphasize its dependency with the initial condition and the control parameter.
The cryptosystem works as follows.
• Step 1) Initialize i = 0, j = 0.
• Step 2) For the i-th plain block Pi formed by bi = b bits, try to find the
first bi-bit segment of {gn}Nmax+bin=j which is equal to Pi; in case a segment
is not found, let bi = bi − 1 and repeat this stepa. The parameter Nmax
indicates the maximum number of trials in the searching of Pi through the
binary sequence.
• Step 3) Denoting by ni the number of iterations needed to locate the dis-
tinguished bi-bit segment from gj , output (bi, ni) as the i-th cipher-block.
aNote that in Ref. 4, there was a typo about bi = bi − 1, which was published as “bi = bi + 1”.
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• Step 4) Set i = i+1 and j = j+ni+ bi b, then go to Step 2 until the whole
plaintext is exhausted.
The decryption process is simpler than the encryption one. In this case, the
searching process becomes unnecessary. For the recovery of the i-th plain block, one
simply iterates the chaotic map from the current status for ni+ bi times and record
the last bi chaotic states, which are then transformed into the i-th bi-bit plain block
according to Eq. (3).
In Ref. 4 it is claimed that the secret key of the cryptosystem is composed of the
initial condition x0 and the control parameter r. For a more detailed description of
the encryption/decryption procedures, the reader is referred to Ref. 4.
3. Chosen-ciphertext attack
In Ref. 4 it is mentioned that most chaotic systems can be used to implement the
above described cryptosystem. Moreover, the resistance of the cryptosystem against
the attacks presented in Ref. 2 is assumed without any security analysis. However,
this section proves that a wrong selection of the chaotic map allows an estimation
of the secret key through a chosen-ciphertext attack.
Among all the possible options, the logistic map was chosen in Ref. 4 as the
chaotic system to prove the reliability of the cryptosystem. The logistic map is
defined as
xn+1 = f(xn, r) = r · xn · (1− xn), (4)
for r ∈ (3.57148, 4) and xn ∈ [0, 1]. The function f(x, r) for the logistic map is
a concave function with only one critical point at 0.5. For this kind of maps the
binary sequence referred in Eq. (3) can be interpreted as a Gray code Ref. 5, 6.
Moreover, in Refs. 7, 8, 9 it is shown that the family of Gray codes generated using
Eq. (3) can be assigned an order according to the initial condition and the control
parameter. The existence of this order allows an estimation of the control parameter
r and the initial condition x0 just by analyzing the binary sequence GN (x0, r) for a
sufficiently large number N . Therefore, as long as one can reconstruct the sequence
GN (x0, r), one can estimate the secret key of the cryptosystem. This is used to build
an attack with three different stages:
(1) Reconstruction of the Gray code derived from the logistic map.
(2) Estimation of the control parameter from the reconstructed Gray code.
(3) Estimation of the initial condition from the reconstructed Gray code and the
estimated control parameter.
bIn Ref. 4 it is not explicitly mentioned how to update the index j. In this paper, we assume that
it is updated in such a way that no segment of a chaotic orbit will be reused for encryption of two
continuous plain blocks.
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3.1. Reconstruction of the Gray code
If one has access to the decryption machine, then one can perform a chosen-
ciphertext attack (see Page 25 of Ref. 10) to reconstruct GN (x0, r), i.e., the Gray
code associated to the values of x0 and r that make up the secret key of the
cryptosystem under study. To do so, M ciphertexts are generated as (b, b · i) for
i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,M . As an example, let us assume that x0 = 0.5 and r = 3.78. In this
case, it is satisfied that
GN (0.5, 3.78) = {1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1 . . .} .
As a result, if we ask the decryption machine to decrypt (8, 0), then we obtain
{1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1}. Similarly, the decryption machine will return {1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0}
when the input is (8, 8), and {1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1} when the input is (8, 16). In other
words, the decryption of the first ciphertext returns the first b bits of GN (x0, r),
the decryption of the second ciphertext gives the second set of b bits of GN (x0, r),
and so on.
3.2. Estimation of the control parameter
If the binary sequence (i.e., the Gray code) derived from the iteration of the logistic
map is known, then it is possible to infer the value of r based on the concept of
Gray Ordering Number (GON). The GON was introduced in Ref. 5 as a way to
reinterpret the main results of Ref. 11 in a more intuitive way. The calculation of
the GON of a binary sequence GN (x0, r) involves two steps:
• The binary sequence is transformed into another binary sequence using the next
equation:
ui(x0, r) =
{
gi(x0, r), if i = 0,
ui−1(x0, r)⊕ gi(x0, r), if i > 0, (5)
where i = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}.
• The GON of the original binary sequence is calculated as:
GON(GN (x0, r)) = 2−1 · u0 + 2−2 · u1 + · · ·+ 2−N−1 · uN . (6)
According to Ref. 8, for any concave unimodal map with critical point equal to
0.5 it is satisfied that
GON(GN (f(x0, r), r)) ≤ GON(GN (f(0.5, r), r)) (7)
for any value of r in [3, 4] and any value of x0 in [0, 1]. Furthermore, the function
GON(GN (f(0.5, r), r)) is an increasing function with respect to r (see Fig. 3(a) of
Ref. 8). These two facts are used in Ref. 8 to estimate the value of the control pa-
rameter r. First of all, the value GON(Gn(f(0.5, r), r)), for n < N , is approximated
as the maximum value of the GON ofM different shift-left sequences obtained from
GN (x0, r). Afterwards, the monotonic relationship between GON(Gn(f(0.5, r), r))
and r is used to obtain an estimation of r through a binary search procedure.
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In order to test this algorithm, some simulations have been carried out. The
parameter estimation errors for r = 3.9197398122739102 are shown in Fig. 1. Dif-
ferent values of x0 and N were considered, for a fixed length of the subsequences
of n = 100. Since this method is based on the approximation of the maximum of
GON(Gn(f(0.5, r), r)) through M different values, it is expected that the exact
value of r cannot be obtained unless the value 0.5 is part of the chaotic orbit from
which the binary sequence was calculated. Moreover, the characteristic dependency
of chaotic maps on the initial condition makes the parameter estimation error de-
pend on the value of x0, as shows in Fig. 1. Nevertheless, the proposed method
allows to obtain an estimation of r which implies a considerable narrowing of the
key space and which can be further improved through a trial and error strategy,
i.e., a brute force attack on the value of the control parameter in a dramatically
reduced key-space.
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Fig. 1. Parameter estimation errors for r = 3.9197398122739102, different values of x0 and N .
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3.3. Estimation of the initial condition
In this subsection we will assume that we have obtained the exact value of r by
using the algorithm discussed in the last subsection. Indeed, when considering the
security of a cryptosystem, a partial knowledge of the key must not lead to the
determination of the rest of the key (see Rule 7 in Ref. 12). Therefore, even if we
were not able to estimate the value of r and obtain the exact value through a brute-
force attack, the recovery of x0 based on the knowledge of the other subkey r would
represent a very important flaw of the cryptosystem under study.
As pointed out in Ref. 8, the GON of GN (x0, r) is a monotonic increasing func-
tion with respect to x0 (see Fig. 1 of Ref. 8). This means that one can obtain
the value of x0 through an iterative algorithm similar to that described in the last
subsection. This algorithm was used to estimate the value of the initial condition
from which GN (x0, r) was generated. Different values of r, x0 and N were consid-
ered. The results are shown in Fig. 2. For all analyzed situations, a number of bits
greater than 80 implies an estimation error below 10−15. Since all the simulations
were performed using double precision, this means that the exact recovery of the
initial condition is possible.
4. Other weaknesses
In this section some other problems of the cryptosystem under study are empha-
sized.
4.1. Considerations about the chaotic system employed
In Ref. 4 it is pointed out that most chaotic systems can be used to implement
the proposed cryptosystem. However, there is no indication of the requirements
that a chaotic system must fulfill to determine a secure cryptosystem according to
the proposed encryption/decryption structure. Moreover, in the previous section
we proved that at least a family of chaotic maps, i.e., the unimodal chaotic maps
with fixed critical point equal to 0.5 cannot be used as long as a high level of
security against chosen-ciphertext attack is needed. Furthermore, a different way
should be used to generate the binary sequence for the encryption procedure. In the
original design, this binary sequence is obtained by comparing each chaotic state
included in a chaotic orbit with the fixed threshold value 0.5. Nevertheless, to ensure
good statistical characteristics of the binary sequence, the threshold value should
be selected according to the dynamics of the underlying chaotic system.
4.2. Considerations about the chaotic orbit generation
The characteristics of a cryptosystem should be precisely defined in order to fa-
cilitate its implementation (see Rule 1 in Ref. 12). During the encryption step of
the cryptosystem under consideration, the plaintext is divided into a set of binary
June 30, 2009 12:44 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE criptaWang08
Cryptanalysis of a New Chaotic Cryptosystem based on Ergodicity 7
20 40 60 80
10−20
10−15
10−10
10−5
100
r=3.9501, x0=0.11937189882
N
x 0
 
e
st
im
at
io
n 
er
ro
r (
Lo
ga
rith
mi
c s
ca
le)
(a)
10 20 30 40 50
10−15
10−10
10−5
100
r=3.9501, x0=0.73819739191
x 0
 
e
st
im
at
io
n 
er
ro
r (
Lo
ga
rith
mi
c s
ca
le)
N
(b)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
10−20
10−15
10−10
10−5
100
N
x 0
 
e
st
im
at
io
n 
er
ro
r (
Lo
ga
rith
mi
c s
ca
le)
r=3.791937037427035, x0=0.11937189882
(c)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
10−20
10−15
10−10
10−5
100
N
x 0
 
e
st
im
at
io
n 
er
ro
r (
Lo
ga
rith
mi
c s
ca
le)
r=3.791937037427035, x0=0.73819739191
(d)
Fig. 2. Initial condition estimation errors for different values of r, x0 and N .
sequences Pi which are successively located in the binary sequence GN (x0, r). It is
possible that Pi is not included in GN (x0, r). In this case, the length of Pi is progres-
sively decreased until it is found in GN (x0, r). Nevertheless, there is no information
about the length of GN (x0, r), i.e., about the maximum number of iterations Nmax
needed to conclude whether the length of Pi must be decreased. Furthermore, not
only the length of GN (x0, r) is not explicitly established, but also some interpreta-
tion problems concerning the precise way of generating GN (x0, r) can be found. Fist
of all, in Ref. 4 it is not mentioned whether the first bit of GN (x0, r) corresponds
to x0 or to x1. On the other hand, once the plain block Pi has been encrypted, it
is not clear whether the next binary sequence starts from GN (xni , r), G
N (xni+1, r)
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or GN (xni+b, r). Note that we fixed these problems in our description of the cryp-
tosystem given in Sec. 2.
4.3. Considerations about the key space
The inadequacy of the logistic map for the implementation of this cryptosystem has
been proved by means of a ciphertext attack. However, the selection of this map
entails another important problem that suggests not to choose the logistic map as
a base of any cryptosystem 13. This problem concerns the definition of the key
space. In Ref. 4 it is claimed that the value of the control parameter r should be
selected within the interval (3.57148...., 4) to exhibit a chaotic behavior. However,
the existence of periodic windows in this region is well known (see Fig. 3) and so
the selection of r should be performed in a more precise manner in order to avoid
these (see Rule 5 in Ref. 12).
Fig. 3. Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map showing the existence of periodic windows.
5. Conclusions
Some weaknesses of the chaotic cryptosystem described in Ref. 4 have been discussed
in this paper. A chosen-ciphertext attack has been described, which can recover the
secret key of the cryptosystem by exploiting the theory of symbolic dynamics. Some
other problems related to the design of the cryptosystem have also been pointed
out. As a result, we recommend not to use this algorithm for secure applications.
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